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Abstract
This paper measures the degree of segmentation in the Brazilian labor market – the wage
diﬀerential between formal and informal workers – with data from the Monthly Employment
Survey (PME), a rotating panel of households in six metropolitan regions. Controlling for ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics, we ﬁnd that workers earn more in the formal sector,
which supports the segmentation hypothesis. Contrary to other studies that rely on two-step
procedures to correct for self-selection bias or repeated cross-sections to account for ﬁxed eﬀects,
our true panel allows us, under certain conditions, to solve both problems simultaneously, pro-
viding a better estimate of the wage diﬀerential. We also break down the degree of segmentation
by age, gender, position in the household and other socio-economic attributes to identify the
groups where this phenomenon is more prevalent. Finally, we investigate the robustness of our
ﬁndings to the inclusion of self-employed individuals, and also use a two-stage panel probit
model to test for a potential weakness of our simple ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator.
Resumo
Este artigo mede o grau de segmenta¸ c˜ ao no mercado de trabalho brasileiro - o diferencial de
sal´ ario entre trabalhadores formais e informais - utilzando os dado da Pesquisa Mensal de Em-
prego (PME), um painel rotativo de domic´ ılios para as seis maiores regi˜ oes metropolitanas do
Brasil. Controlando por vari´ aveis observ´ aveis e n˜ ao observ´ aveis, n´ os encontramos que trabal-
hadores recebem mais no setor formal, sugerindo a existˆ encia de segmenta¸ c˜ ao. Diferentemente
de outros estudos que dependem de procedimentos de dois est´ agios para corrigir vi´ es de auto-
selec˜ ao ou cross-section repetidas para lidar com efeitos ﬁxo, nosso painel verdadeiro, sob certas
condi¸ c˜ oes, permite resolver simultaneamente ambos os problemas, gerando um estimador mel-
hor do diferencial de sal´ arios. Al´ em disso, n´ os calculamos o grau de segmenta¸ c˜ ao condicional em
diferentes caracter´ ısticas como idade, gˆ enero, e posi¸ c˜ ao na fam´ ılia, entre outros atributos s´ ocio-
econˆ omicos. Por ´ ultimo, investigamos a robustez dos resultados ap´ os a inclus˜ ao na amostra de
proﬁssionais conta-pr´ opria e usamos um modelo probit em dois est´ agios para testar potenciais
problemas no modelo de efeitos ﬁxos simples.
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1 Introduction
A salient feature of the Brazilian labor market is the existence of a signiﬁcant number of unregistered
workers.1 Formal and informal positions diﬀer in several dimensions. While registered (or formal)
workers usually have access to several fringe beneﬁts, individuals employed in the underground
economy lack the access to some of them. According to the model proposed by Rosen (1986), in
a frictionless labor market, average earnings should be higher in the less ‘desirable’ informal sector
to compensate for the non-pecuniary beneﬁts granted to registered workers. That is, assuming that
the value of the beneﬁts is non-negative, direct payments in the informal sector should be at least
as high as those in the formal economy to oﬀset the lack of beneﬁts. Otherwise, workers would
choose only jobs in the above-ground economy, increasing the supply of labor to formal ﬁrms and
driving down the wages in the legal economy. The opposite would happen in the informal sector,
arbitraging away the wage diﬀerential favoring formal jobs. The coexistence of both markets with
a wage diﬀerentials favoring formal workers points out to barriers to entry into the formal sector or
some other friction that prevents workers from moving to high-paying jobs. In this case, we say that
the market would be segmented. This papers measures the degree of segmentation in the Brazilian
labor market by comparing wages of workers as they move across sectors, and ﬁnds that the same
workers earns signiﬁcantly less in the informal sector, suggesting that the market is segmented, an
empirical ﬁnding in need of explanation.
From the point of view of economic eﬃciency, a segmented market fails to optimally allocate
workers to ﬁrms. There are two sources of ineﬃciency. Assume that ﬁrms hire workers up to
the point where the marginal value of the productivity equals the prevailing wage rate. In this
case, there would be workers currently employed in the low-productivity informal sector willing to
supply labor to high-productivity ﬁrms in the formal sector at a lower cost (wages plus beneﬁts). A
segmented market (caused by barriers to entry) prevents this eﬃcient movement of workers across
ﬁrms in diﬀerent sectors, maintaining the productivity diﬀerential. The second source has to do
with the wage/beneﬁts composition in the formal sector. The value attached to the fringe beneﬁts
by the workers may be lower than the cost t hat the ﬁrms must incur to provide them. Therefore,
those workers would be willing to exchange beneﬁts for a higher wage, that would cost less for the
ﬁrms. Even though segmentation could arise due to asymmetric information between ﬁrms and
workers in an eﬃciency-wage framework,2 in the particular case under study in this paper, namely
segmentation across formal and informal sectors in Brazil, the usual suspect is the labor legislation.
These observations make the measurement of the degree of segmentation an important issue for
policy-makers.
The issue at hand – namely the presence of segmentation – is essentially an empirical endeavor,
but not a simple one. Due to observable and unobservable characteristics, unconditional comparisons
of wage means would be misleading. For instance, workers in the formal sector may be more educated
compared to their peers in the informal sector. Therefore, part of the wage diﬀerential would be
explained by schooling diﬀerences. A na¨ ıve approach to estimate the wage advantage of the formal
workers by simply comparing means would result in an upward-biased estimate of the segmentation
degree. One way to get around this problem is to add controls in a regression framework. In the
literature, the variables usually added to the regression as controls include gender, experience, and
race.3
1The expressions informal and unregistered are used exchangeably to refer to individuals employed in the informal
sector, without proper registration. The empirical counterpart of this deﬁnition is discussed below. It is also important
to mention that, in this paper, informal sector refers to a feature of the jobs and not to the ﬁrm in which the worker
is employed. Even though we do not have reliable information about the ﬁrms (employers) in this survey, one can
conjecture that most informal workers are indeed employed by informal ﬁrms.
2See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for a model in which segmentation and involuntary unemployment arise in equi-
librium.
3Table 7 presents some descriptive statistics for both groups in our dataset.Segmentation 3
A trickier issue that one has to tackle in order to identify the degree of segmentation is the endo-
geneity caused by unobservable characteristics of the individuals, like ability and intrinsic preferences.
The presence of unobservable attributes may cause bias in the estimates, since these characteristics
may jointly determine the sector in which the individual will eventually work and his/her earnings.
For instance, a more risk-averse individual tends to prefer the formal sector in which the probability
of dismissal is lower, and in case of lay-oﬀ, one is eligible for unemployment insurance. Furthermore,
it is possible that risk averse workers are more prone to eﬀort, resulting in higher wages.
In the literature, the endogeneity of the sectoral choice is dealt with by methods that address
selection bias (a Heckman two-stage procedure). This procedure consists in estimating a sectoral
choice equation in the ﬁrst stage (by specifying a probit model), and constructing the correction
terms to be used as regressors in the main wage regression. To follow this approach it is important
to have variables that can be simultaneously included in the ﬁrst stage and excluded in the main
regression.4 These excluded variables must have two properties. They should be orthogonal to the
errors of the main equation and also relevant to determine the sectoral choice in the ﬁrst stage. In
the datasets available in Brazil it is hard to think of a variable satisfying both conditions.
Our approach explores the panel data structure of the monthly employment survey (PME) con-
ducted by the Brazilian national statistics agency IBGE. Our longitudinal dataset allows us to keep
track of the same individual over several periods. Since the Brazilian labor market is characterized
by signiﬁcant labor force turnover, we observe several intersectoral transitions over time. Compared
to a cross-section structure, our approach allows us to calculate the wage variation during a transi-
tion from one sector to the other for the same individual. This strategy is consistent even if there
are unobservable attributes which simultaneously determine sectoral choice and earnings as long as
those characteristics are constant over time.5 The previous studies that use a cross-section structure
cannot control for unobservable attributes and consequently will obtain biased estimates when the
observable characteristics jointly explain sectoral choice and earnings. Nevertheless, the ﬁxed-eﬀect
estimator has a potential ﬂaw.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature related to this topic. A brief
overview of the Brazilian labor market is presented in section 3. Section 4 talks about our database.
Our empirical strategy is presented in section 5. Section 6 presents and discusses the results. Section
7 concludes and points out direction for further research in the topic.
2 Literature Review
The study of market segmentation is not a new theme in the literature, and particular attention has
been devoted to the occurence of this phenomenon in the labor markets, in developing as well as
developed countries.6 Our main concern in this paper is the measurement of the wage diﬀerentials
between similar workers in diﬀerent sectors, which is one of the central questions addressed by
this literature. As pointed out by several authors, signiﬁcant wage diﬀerentials that persist after
controlling for individual attributes indicate the existence of barriers to entry in the formal/primary
sector.7 Broadly speaking, there are two views of the informal labor market. One of them considers
4Even though this model can be identiﬁed without the exclusion of any variable from the main equation due to
the non-linearity in the ﬁrst stage, this procedure is considered unreliable since the correction term tends to be highly
correlated with the other covariates, specially in the range in which the inverse Mills ratio is almost linear, inﬂating
the standard errors, and reducing considerably the accuracy of the estimators.
5Indeed, we just need the variation of the unobservable attributes not to be jointly correlated with the earnings
and sectoral choice variation.
6Leontaridi (1998) provides a comprehensive survey of this literature, with some reference to the econometric issues
involved in the measurement of segmentation.
7Another important branch of this literature investigates how one’s attributes, like education and experience, are
valued diﬀerently in the two sectors. In this respect, there is some evidence that the returns to education are lower in
the informal sector. Since we estimate wage diﬀerentials in a panel data framework and there are only a few changesSegmentation 4
informal work as a transitory phase for entrants in the labor market, and a buﬀer between formal
employment and unemployment, being a transitory state during recessions. Therefore, lacking the
ability to cross the barrier into the formal sector, where the good and desirable, but rationed, jobs are,
workers take advantage of the ﬂexibility of precarious positions in the underground economy. Due
to institutional barriers (labor regulations, minimum wage, and unions), wages of formal worker do
not fall to clear the market, and informal workers would prefer a positions held by their counterparts
(with similar attributes) elsewhere. Several other authors, including Maloney (2004), point out that
the beneﬁts of being in the formal sector are ellusive, since public services oﬀered to formal worker
are ineﬃcient. According to this view, informal jobs may be a desirable alternative, providing more
ﬂexibility, and allowing both sides of the market to avoid cumbersome and expensive regulations – and
taxes. In this scenario, one could not assert that the labor market is segmented, since unregistered
workers may prefer their current positions, sorting themselves into the informal sector. In the Brazlian
case, even though the jobs in the informal sector may provide beneﬁts invisible to the outside observer,
we believe that formal sector positions are more desirable (even after holding observable pecuniary
and non-pecuniary rewards constant). In this case, the test of the segmentation hypothesis hinges
on the magnitude of wage diﬀerentials, with a wage premium in the formal sector supporting the
ﬁrst view.
Several authors have proposed a measure of the degree of segmentation, for Brazil as well as
other LDC’s.8 The empirical strategies can be divided into three categories: cross-sectional stud-
ies that correct for self-selection bias, repeated cross-sections that group individuals to control for
unobservables, and longitudinal methods applied to panel data. Carneiro and Henley (2001) is an
example of the ﬁrst approach, ﬁnding some evidence against the segmentation hypothesis. More
precisely, the empirical evidence does not reject a model in which some workers choose sector ac-
cording to, among other things, the potential wage in each sector. Therefore, the wage diﬀerential
could be explained by diﬀerences in personal characteristics of separate sets of workers that make
one sector more attractive due to a higher potential wage. The correction for the endogeneity of the
occupational choice, a multi-stage estimation procedure, is therefore applied. This strategy consists
in estimating a propensity to join each sector in the ﬁrst stage9 and using the estimated Mills ratios
to correct for the selection bias in the earnings equations. This approach strongly relies on the exis-
tence of a set of instruments that explain earning only indirectly, through the likelihood of choosing
a sector.10 Moreover, cross-sectional studies are very susceptible to omitted variable bias due to
the presence of unnobservable attributes. Magnac (1991) adopts a similar approach to investigate
market segmentation in Colombia, failing to reject the null hypothesis that the market is integrated.
Filho et al. (2004), using a repeated cross-sections of Brazilian household surveys (PNAD), also
concludes against the segmentation conjecture. Grouping the individuals according to age (birth
cohort), education, and time, the authors try to control for unobservable characteristics. By con-
structing a pseudo-panel and controlling for group ﬁxed eﬀects, the authors ﬁnd that workers in the
formal sector do not earn more than their counterparts in the informal market. Indeed, they ﬁnd the
opposite: informal workers earn much higher wage than similar workers in the above groud economy.
This informal wage premium could be a compensation for the foregone beneﬁts in the formal sector.
The weakness of the method lies on its limited ability to control for unobservable attributes. With
a genuine panel, we can explicitly control for unobservables which are constant over time.11
in educational attainment within individuals, there is not much we can say about this question without losing the
ability to control for unobservable attributes.
8Ulyssea (2005) is a comprehensive review of the literature addressing the informal market and the measurement
of the degree of segmentation in Brazil.
9One can interpret the equation of the ﬁrst stage as determining the relative beneﬁt of joining each sector, condi-
tional on personal attributes.
10As discussed before, in the absence of instruments one is forced to rely on non-linearities in order to identify the
main equation, which considerably reduces the precision of the estimator.
11Barros et al. (1993) apply the same technique and reach similar consclusions.Segmentation 5
Closer to the approach adopted here, Maloney (1999) uses data from the Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo Urbano, which, like the PME, is a rotating panel of urban households, to gauge the degree of
segmentation in the Mexican labor market. As argued below, the longitudinal structure allows the
author to examine how the wage rate changes when the worker moves between formal and informal
employment. Contrary to our conclusion, the Mexican labor market seems to be more integrated, with
workers who transit to informal salaried work experiencing a pay increase. Therefore, as pointed out
in the paper, it is hard to access to what extent the wage premium in the informal sector compesates
for the loss of beneﬁts. This conclusion supports the view that the informal paid work may be a
viable option for certain groups – namely young, less skilled workers – who want to escape taxes and
regulations that plague the formal sector. Pratap and Quintin (2006) conclude that the evidence
cannot reject the hypothesis that the Argentinian labor market is integrated. Applying a semi-
parametric methods to a panel of Argentinian households, the authors found the wage diﬀerential
between formal and informal employmet to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Like the Mexican
case, one cannot assert whether the absence of a wage premium in the informal sector compensates
the absence of beneﬁts of formal sector employment (if any).
3 Overview of the Brazilian Labor Market
Among the salient features of the Brazilian labor market, the high number of unregistered workers
is the one that deserves most attention. Approximately 26% of the workers in our sample are
unregistered, not including the unregistered self-employed. The stringent labor legislation and the
several macroeconomic crisis that aﬀected the country in the last twenty years, with alternating
periods of recession and high inﬂation, are usually blamed for this widespread phenomenon.12
Since labor regulations are pervasive and leave little room for direct negotiation between workers
and ﬁrms, full compliance with the labor codes is expensive and cumbersome. A good indicator of
the degree of segmentation is whether the worker has a ‘signed’ work booklet (Carteira Nacional de
Trabalho), an identiﬁcation card issued by the Ministry of Labor. The terms of the contract between
the employee and the employer are supposed to be registered in this booklet, and by making the
registration (signing the booklet), the employer automatically agrees to comply to the clauses of a
standard labor contract, as deﬁned by the Brazilian Labor Code (Consolida¸ c˜ ao das Leis do Trabalho),
written in 1943 and slightly modiﬁed since then.13 Among other things, that statute dictates that the
worker is entitled to several beneﬁts, like a thirteenth wage to be paid sometime between November
and December, a one-month paid vacation, severance payment for unjustiﬁed dismissal (which must
be communicated to the worker one month in advance), work week of forty four hours, at least ﬁfty
percent premium for overtime work, food and transport subsidy, and a four-month paid pregnancy
leave of absence for women. Moreover, wages must be at least as high as the minimum wage. There
is a statute of limitations that allows workers to sue the former employers for violations up to ﬁve
years after the contract was terminated.14
As we mentioned in the introduction, there are two types of ineﬃciencies imposed by this leg-
islation. On the one hand, the combination of wages and beneﬁts may not be the most eﬃcient:
workers and ﬁrms would have an incentive to negotiate another mix of wages and beneﬁts, cheaper
for ﬁrms to pay and utility-improving for workers. On the other hand, by imposing a minimum wage
which can be binding for less productive workers, the legislation may be destroying jobs and creating
ineﬃciency, as argued extensively in the literature about the impact of the minimum wage. If the
12Increased trade openness during the 90’s may also have contributed to increased informally by increasing the
relative importance of the services sector – where informal employment is more prevalent – relative to manufacturing.
13The Federal Constitution that went into eﬀect in 1988 changed some aspects of the labor legislation, modifying,
among other things, the regulation concerning the duration of the work week and severance payment for unjustiﬁed
dismissal.
14A comprehensive description of the legislation in Brazil is provided in Amadeo et al. (2000).Segmentation 6
prescriptions of the labor code are inneﬁcient, leaving room for workers and ﬁrms to bargain and
reach agreements in the shadow of the law, how can we have market segmentation? In other words,
why do ﬁrms end up creating formal jobs instead of hiring informal workers for a lower wage, bidding
up wages in the underground sector?
One conjecture points to how labor disputes are adjudicated in Brazil. As dictated by the Labor
Code, a special branch of the judiciary is responsible for cases involving labor disputes. Moreover,
contracts that do not satisfy all the provisions of the Labor Code are considered void, and workers
can sue their employers for non-compliance with the legislation. The burden of proof falls on the
employers, that have to prosent convincing evidence that the terms of the contract were fulﬁlled. If
a certain worker can prove that the labor relationship ever existed – and the standard of proof is
low, being suﬃcient to provide an eye-witness — the ﬁrm is supposed to prove that the requirements
imposed by the legislation were fulﬁlled. Otherwise, the employers may be subject to a ﬁne and
payment of compensation to the worker. Therefore, violations of the labor law is the employers’
responsibility, even if an informal agreement was reached in advance between the parts. Even though
spontaneous detection by the authorities is rather unusual, this labor law branch of the judiciary has
been very active, adjudicating about one million cases in 2003 in the states analyzed in this paper.
This possibility of suing the employer after the relationship has been severe may deter some ﬁrms
and (potential) employers from resorting to informal arrangement.
4 The Data
The Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME), or Monthly Employment Survey, is a monthly rotating
panel of dwellers in six major metropolitan areas in Brazil (S˜ ao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte,
Salvador, Porto Alegre e Recife). Together these six metropolitan regions encompass approximately
30% of the population. We used data from 1995 to 200115 to avoid the high inﬂation period before
the monetary stabilization plan in 1994 (Plano Real).16 This dataset is compiled by the Brazilian
national statistical agency – Instituto Nacional de Geograﬁa e Estat´ ıstica (IBGE).
The survey investigates schooling, labor force, demographic, and earnings characteristics of each
member of the household age 10 and over, for every interviewed household. Approximately 100,000
individuals in 35,000 households are interviewed every month. Households are interviewed once per
month for four consecutive months, then there is an eight-month window when they stand by; after
this period, the household is interviewed for another four-month period. For instance, suppose that
the ﬁrst interview was conducted in January. The second, third, and fourth interviews will take
place in February, March and April of the same year, respectively. From May to December the
household will rotate out of the sample. From January to March of the following year the household
is interviewed again and, after this spell, the household is permanently excluded from the sample.
Since the main purpose of this survey is to measure the unemployment in the major metropolitan
areas in the country, individuals are not directly identiﬁed, but only their households. Therefore, we
match individuals within households over time using gender, month and year of birth, as well as the
IBGE’s identiﬁcation codes. The main questions for the purpose of our study are earnings and the
hours worked in the month of reference, the legal status (with or without signed work booklet), the
sector of activity, and some variables such as age, gender and schooling.
To avoid seasonality issues, we use observations exactly one year apart. Our regressions include
only the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth interviews. Since we lose track of some individuals along the interview
period, this strategy maximizes the number of usable observations. The problem of attrition is usually
found in longitudinal surveys, and the PME is not an exception. It is challenging to follow individuals
15December/1995 to September/2001.
16Since our identiﬁcation strategy relies on intertemporal comparisons, it is also important to deﬂate the nominal
variables. Even though this is less of a problem after 1995 after the fall of the inﬂation rate, we deﬂate the data using
the deﬂator proposed by Corseuil and Foguel (2002).Segmentation 7
for sixteen months in the urban environment of a developing country where most of the people do
not own their dwellings, and move-overs are frequent. This eﬀect could bias our estimates if the
individuals who stay in the sample longer have diﬀerent responses to change in the formal-informal
wage gap. For example, since the household – not the individual – is the sampling unit, every time an
individual moves out from the original dwelling, (s)/he is excluded from the sample. Moreover, our
matching method to track individuals may not be foolproof. That is, due to coding errors, we may
be unable to track the individual over time if one of the variables used to match him/her varies across
interviews. This second source of attrition is less harmful since it is more likely to be unrelated to
the outcome of interest.17 The ﬁrst cause of attrition could be more problematic, since the decision
to move out is less likely to be orthogonal to both sectoral choice and earnings. In order to gauge
the importance of this source of attrition, we compare subsample composed by individuals with eight
interviews (’low’ attrition) with a subsample formed by individuals who dropped out of the sample
after the ﬁfth interview (’high’ attrition).18 Other feature of the survey, which makes it particularly
prone to measurement error, is the fact that the information about some individuals is provided by
another dweller, usually the head of the household. To investigate whether these observations are
a source of bias, we compare the segmentation in a subsample of self-reported individual with the
remaining of the sample.
Finally, we consider only employees in the private sector and exclude self-employed workers in
the benchmark speciﬁcation. First, wages in the public sector are dictated by factors other than
market forces. Second, even though the so-called self employed constitute a signiﬁcant - and growing
- fraction of the labor market, this category is extremely heterogenous, including individuals as
distinct as street vendors and doctors. Furthermore, self-employed workers are supposed to satisfy
diﬀerent criteria and regulations to join the formal sector.19 As a robustness test, we run similar
regressions including the self-employed in the sample.
5 Empirical Strategy and Identiﬁcation
As we mentioned in section 3, the issue of identifying segmentation hinges on the wage diﬀerential
between formal and informal workers, with a positive diﬀerence in favor of formal workers suggest-
ing the presence of barriers to entry. Therefore, the main goal is to devise a strategy to measure
that magnitude appropriately and to identify groups of individuals where the phenomenon is more
prevalent. Most studies in the literature use a cross-section framework, and rely on variations across
individuals to estimate wage diﬀerentials. Instead, by using a panel structure, we directly control
for the total individual ﬁxed eﬀect, using the wage variation of the same individual to measure the
wage gap. First, we estimate the benchmark equation
log(wi,t) = α0 + θ bi,t + β
0 Xi,t + ei,t (1)
where Xi,t is a vector of observable covariates for individual i in period t. The vector Xi,t will typically
include variables like the sector of employment (to control for wage inequalities among industries),
17The results reported here are based on a ﬁlter that considers V101, V102 and V103 (IBGE’s id codes), V202
(gender), V206 (day of birth), V236 (month of birth), and V246 (year of birth), and schooling (V208, V209, and
V210). Out of the 156,233 individuals who had a ﬁrst interview, 117,282 were located sucessufully one year after,
resulting in an attrition rate of 38.5%. Nevertheless we tried several diﬀerent combinations of variables to match
individuals across time, including day, month and year of birth, gender, and position in the household. The results
obtained with the various speciﬁcations do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer from each other. The results are available upon
request.
18As we argue later, the conclusions of this exercise may be misleading, since most of the attrition occurs during
the window – between fourth and ﬁfth interviews, and individuals that drop out of the sample between the fourth and
ﬁfth interviews may be intrinsically diﬀerent from the one that do it later.
19Self-employed workers are required by law to pay income taxes and social security contribution. The other fringe
beneﬁts, as one might expected, are not mandatory.Segmentation 8
and a dummy variable indicating the year (to eliminate any aggregate trend in the wage rate). Notice
that the ﬁxed eﬀect framework does not allow us to include other variables that are constant over
time, like gender and race. Also, since the universe of analysis includes only individuals over 16
(above school age), education does not change over time for most of the individuals. Therefore, it
is hard to include a measure of schooling as a covariate. The same is true for other variables like
position in the household.
It is also possible to assess how the degree of segmetation changes in the several subgroups that
make up the sample. For instance, we woud like to know whether the pattern is heterogeneous for
diﬀerent metropolitan regions or industries of occupation. Our regression strategy to carry out this
analysis is based on the equation
log(wi,t) = α0 + bi,t (θ + φ
0 Vi) + β
0 Xi,t + ei,t, (2)
where Vi is a vector of time-invariant attributes. The coeﬃcient vector of coeﬃcients φ measures
how the degree of segmentation depends on Vi. Therefore, we can investigate whether the degree of
segmentation is more pervasive is certain subgroups of the population.
Back to the ﬁxed eﬀect approach, we assume that the error term in (1) can be further decomposed
into
ei,t = µi + i,t (3)
with µi being the individual ﬁxed eﬀect (constant over time), and i,t is a random error term. The
crucial identifying assumption is that i,t is uncorrelated with bi,t or Xi,t. That is, any variable that
is not constant over time and is correlated with earnings cannot be relevant for the sectoral choice.
More speciﬁcally, the consistency of ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator hinges on the assumption that conditional
on the covariates and any ﬁxed characteristic of the individuals, the selection process is uncorrelated
with the earnings. Assume the following sectoral choice process:
bit = 1(γZit+uit≥0), (4)
where Zit is a set of variables explaining sectoral choice. A suﬃcient condition for our identiﬁcation
assumption to be valid is
E(uit eit) = 0. (5)
However, this condition is too strong, and a much weaker assumption is suﬃcient for consistency
in our case. Let
uit = αi + υit, (6)
where αi is a ﬁxed eﬀect that captures individual characteristics that inﬂuence the sectoral choice.
Even in case αi and µi are correlated, as long as υit and it are not, ˆ θ will be a consistent estimator of
the degree of segmentation. This strategy is consistent even if there are unobservable attributes which
simultaneously determine sectoral choice and earnings as long as those characteristics are constant
over time.20 The previous works which use a cross-section structure cannot control for unobservable
attributes, and consequently will obtain biased estimates when the observable characteristics jointly
explain sectoral choice and earnings. Moreover, our approach does not require assumptions about
the distribution of i,t, since we are directly conditioning in the individual ﬁxed eﬀect. This is another
advantage of the panel data structured relative to two-step estimators that use cross-section data
and require a known joint distribution of the errors in both stages.
Nevertheless, the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator has a potential ﬂaw. Whenever the relevant unobservable
attributes changes over time and their variation is correlated with the earnings and sectoral choice
variations, the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator is inconsistent. For example, if workers can forecast their relative
prospects in both sectors and make the sectoral choice decision based on those expectations (which
20Indeed, we just need the variation of the unobservable attributes not to be jointly correlated with the earnings
and sectoral choice variation.Segmentation 9
are not observed), then the transition from one sector to the other may also be endogenous.21 One
way to remedy this ﬂaw is to use the method described in Botelho and Ponczek (2006). Brieﬂy,
this approach consists in a two-step procedure: in the ﬁrst step, the endogenous binary variable is
modeled as a random-eﬀect probit, being explained by an exogenous instrument. Next, the second
stage includes also correction terms constructed to account for the endogenous switching between
sectors. We can measures the strength of the instrument in the ﬁrst stage: a good instrument
is relevant to explain sectoral choice, but does not aﬀect earnings directly. In the absence of the
endogenous switching problem, both estimators are consistent, however the pure ﬁxed-eﬀect model
is more eﬃcient. A straighforward way to check for the presence of endogenous switching is to test
the signiﬁcance of the correction terms in the second stage. Under the null hypothesis that the binary
variable is exogenous, the coeﬁcient of the correction term is assymptotically distributed as a zero
mean normal and its signiﬁcance can be assessed by the usual t-test.
In summary, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator will build consistent estimates of the degree of segmentation
even in the presence of potential selection bias when the source of bias is a correlation between
formal/informal sector and unobserved factors which made diﬀer across individuals but is constant
over time for each individual. If selection into the sector takes this form, the simple ﬁxed-eﬀect
estimator is a straightforward way to deal with selection bias.
6 Results
This section presents the main ﬁndings and brieﬂy discusses each one of them. Our main purpose
is the measurement of the average segmentation degree in the population. We also try to measure
the degree of segmentation of diﬀerent subgroups determined by social-economic and demographic
characteristics. Moreover, we exploit various diﬀerent speciﬁcations as tests of robustness. Sometimes
they uncover interesting patterns, which are worthy mentioning.
Table 7 presents some simple descriptive statistics. We based the calculations in the ﬁrst interview
of each individual in the sample. In our sample, around 26% of the workers are informal. This number
is lower than the national average (around 45%) once it only includes the six largest metropolitan
areas of the country, where informalilty is less common. 60% of our sample are males, who work less
in the informal sector than women. The construction industry presents the highest proportion of
informality. On the other end, the manufacturing industry displays the smallest degree of informality.
The disparity in the degree of informality by industry could be associated with diﬀerences in type
of the labor demand in each industry. For instance, it is possible that the manufacturing industry
demands high-specialized workers, which might be more organized and unionized compared to the
low-skilled workers in the construction industry. Over the years under study, informality has slightly
increased (from 26% in 1995 to 27.2% in 2000) with only small ﬂuctuations every year, which could
be capturing a regular activity level variation over the period. Recife/PE, in the Northwest of the
country, is the metropolitan area with the highest degree of informality (32%), followed by Belo
Horizonte/MG, Salvador/BA, S˜ ao Paulo/SP, Rio de Janeiro/RJ, and ﬁnally Porto Alegre/RS, in
the southmost part of the country with only 20% of informal workers. Once again, those regional
diﬀerence might be associated with diﬀerence in the workers characteristics (like union participation)
of the workers in each one of the cities. Formal workers have a much higher hourly wage than their
informal counterparts. By the same token, the two groups also diﬀer in observable attributes, with
formal workers being older (more experienced) and more educated, and working more hours.
To what extent can these diﬀerences explain the gap in earnings between sectors? By adding
controls in an OLS regression, one can trivially isolated the fraction of the variation in earning that
21Ideally, we would like to observe the same individual’s earnings, at the time,in both sectors. In this hypothetical
situation, the mean wage diﬀerential would be a clear and immediate indicator of the degree of segmentation in this
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is not explained by the observables. A more subtle issue has to do with non-observable attributes,
like talent, motivation, and ability that may be related to sectoral choice and earnings. In this
scenario the ordinary regression strategy may fail to obtain a consistent estimator of the degree of
segmentation, whereas a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimator may, under certain conditions, account for both issues
– self-selection and unobservable variables. Indeed, the random eﬀects model can only produce
consistent estimator if the individual eﬀects are not correlated with the other regressors. Table 7
presents the results of a Hausman test, which rejects this hypothesis, concluding that the individual
eﬀects are indeed correlated with the regressors and rendering the random eﬀect model inconsistent.
Therefore, we adopt a ﬁxed-eﬀect model in the regressions below. In both speciﬁcations, we included
years and industry dummy variables to capture the trend pattern and also to isolate eﬀects caused
by changes in the industry from the degree of segmentation. We can see that this is ﬁgure is around
7.8% for the period investigated.
Our ﬁrst set of robustness-check regressions breaks down the transitions into two types – from
formal to informal employment, and vice-versa – and investigates the earnings gains or losses associ-
ated with the transition. For formal to informal job transitions, individuals that stay in their formal
sector jobs are used as a reference group, to account for overall wage gains. For the other type of
transition, informal sector stayers are used as controls. The results are presented in table 4 (column
1 for formal to informal transitions). From formal to informal, there appears to be a wage premium
of about 7.2% in the formal sector, and 8.4% in the other direction. However, we could not reject
the hypothesis that both coeﬃcient are the equal, implying a symmetric eﬀect in the transition from
one sector to the other: the gain from transiting from an informal job to a formal one is comparable
to the loss one incurs by going the other way.
Table 6 displays three other speciﬁcations. In column 1, we included several interaction variables
to capture diﬀerences in the degrees of segmentation for various subgroups of the population.
Is the segmentation higher among men or women? By looking at the column (1) of the table,
one can see that the degree of segmentation is lower among women (-3.6%). Broadly speaking, when
transiting from informal to formal employment, earnings increase, on average, 3.6% more for men
than for women. This result seems to contradict the intuition that inﬂexible labor laws are the main
cause of the segmentation in the Brazilian labor market, since women in the formal sector have a
4-month paid pregnancy leave of absence as an additional beneﬁt. We wondered whether this seemly
odd result could have been driven by diﬀerences in the position women usually has within the family
in Brazil. Most households with both a man and a women have the man as head of the family and
maybe the result of the gender coeﬃcient might be capturing that characteristic. However, this does
not seem to be the case. It can been seen at table 9, that the segmentation among male heads is
actually signiﬁcantly smaller (3.9%) than for other males, which does not occur with head females.
Moreover, we observe that the segmentation of a spouse female is also smaller than the other females
(-5.7%). If one could sort the groups by the degree of segmentation, (s)/he would have that Male
(non spouse/head > Female (non spouse/head ≥ male head > female spouse.22
Has the degree of segmentation changed during the period of analysis? To investigate this issue
we construct a variable which is the interaction between the work status and a dummy indicating
the year in which the ﬁrst interview took place. By including this variable in the regression, we are
allowing the wage diﬀerential to diﬀer according to the year of the ﬁrst interview. Since the base
year is 1995, the individuals who had the ﬁrst interview in 1996 experience a gain of approximately
7% higher than in previous year. For workers who made the transition between 1997 and 1998, this
diﬀerential rises by 5 percentage points compared to 1995, and so on. 1997 and 2000 present a higher
level of segmentation compared to the base year.
22We also checked if those results were capturing diﬀerences in the number of members in the household headed
by a man or a woman by including a set of interaction terms of sectoral choice and dummy variables indicating the
number of members in the family. The results were very similar to those presented in table 9 and are available upon
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The bottom of the ﬁrst part of table 6 presents the degree of segmentation in the metropolitan
regions where the survey is undertaken. The reference region in the Greater Recife, which displays
the highest level of segmentation. The metropolitan regions of Rio de Janeiro and Porto Alegre seem
to be less segmented than the other areas. We could not reject the null hypothesis that Recife, Belo
Horizonte, Salvador and S˜ ao Paulo have the same degree of segmentation.
As mentioned in the introduction, formal sector workers are entitled to receive an extra salary
at the end of the year. To prevent our conclusions from being contaminated by the eﬀect of this
thirteenth salary, we run the regression with a dummy indicating the months of December and
January23. As can be seen from column three in table 1, those two months display a higher degree
of segmentation than the other months (3% more), indicating that over the extra salary at the end
of the year indeed account for a fraction of the wag gap between formal and informal workers.
In all regressions, we are controlling for wage diﬀerentials between industries to disentangle the
industry eﬀect from the formal-informal eﬀect.24 Nevertheless, we would like also to test if there
are disparities in the degree of segmentation for diﬀerent industries. We perform this analysis by
interacting an indicator of industry in the ﬁrst interview with labor status, for the individuals that
were employed in the same industry in both periods. Manufacturing is the reference group. Con-
struction and services present a lower degree of segmentation (around 7% and 5.4%, respectively)
and we could barely reject the hypothesis that commerce has the same degree of segmentation as
the manufacturing.
Since the worker is not necessarily the person interviewed in the household, we wondered whether
measurement errors could be an issue in our study. It is very likely that other members of the
families do not know accurately the relevant information, such as earnings, sectoral choice, and
other demographics about another family member in the sample. In order to access to what extent
information given by other members is biasing our results, we introduced an interaction term with
a dummy variable that speciﬁes whether the worker him/herself was interviewed. It can be seen in
column 2 of table 6 that the interaction term is not signiﬁcant suggesting that information given by
other familys member is not misleading our results.
Is attrition a serious problem? As mentioned in section 4, we lose track of 38.5% of our sample
from the ﬁrst to the ﬁfth interview. Therefore, our results capture only the wage premium of those
who stay in the sample. As discussed before, this phenomenon could potentially bias the results if
there is any characteristic associate to those who stay correlated with the sectoral choice and earnings.
In order to investigate if attrition could jeopardize our results, we introduce another interaction term
by creating a dummy variable that indicates whether the individual has not left the sample after the
ﬁfth interview, i.e., if (s)he completed all 8 rounds of interviews. Column 3 of table 6 shows the results
of the regression, with the coeﬃcient of the interaction term being non-signiﬁcant. This indicates
that at least attrition after the ﬁfth interview is not correlated with the degree of segmentation. Of
course, to accept the claim that attrition is not biasing our results one should believe that the moving
decisions made between the ﬁrst and ﬁfth interviews are the same (at least correlated with the same
variables) of those made between the ﬁfth and the eighth interview. However, since those who left
the sample only after the ﬁfth interview lived in the same address for at least 12 months25, this type
of dropouts could be very diﬀerent from those who left before the ﬁfth interview. For instance, since
homeowners move much less frequently than tenants, it is more likely that we have more homeowners
in the second type of dropouts than in the ﬁrst one.
Next, we turn to the degree of segmentation over the life-cycle. By adding the interaction between
labor status and age we can analyze how the segmentation changes as the individual ages. The
23This end-of-year bonus is usually paid in December, and acounted for in January. The results are displayed in the
top of the second part of table 6
24Even though inter-industry transition are not so usual, the wage diﬀerentials paid to workers in diﬀerent industries
may be very signiﬁcant, jeopardizing our conclusions.
25Remember that the ﬁfth interview occurs one year after the ﬁrst one, subsequent to the 8 months windowSegmentation 12
interactions between labor status and age bracket dummies capture non-linearities in the relationship.
Is the transition to informality more painful for younger workers as compared to mature adults? Our
result shows that segmentation is actually more painful for young workers. One could conjecture that
a policy to make the access of young workers to the labor market should contemplate the question
of segmentation, its causes and consequences. To account for other types of non-linearity, we divide
the workers in three age brackets (less than 30, 30-49, and more than 49) according to the age in the
ﬁrst interview. Segmentation falls with age, with the diﬀerence being statistically signiﬁcant. We
also created three categories to measure schooling achievement. The reference group (schooling=0)
represents individuals with incomplete fundamental education (including the illeterate). The second
group comprises individuals with at least complete fundamental education but no college attendance.
Finally, the third group includes all workers with at least some college level education (including
college dropouts). By interacting this set of dummies with the age groups, we can observe how the
life-cycle paterns diﬀer for the various schooling level, and vice-versa. For instance, the baseline
group (young individuals with little schooling) is 10 percentage points more segmented than the
oldest and more educated group. Overall, segmentation decreases as the individual becomes older
and more educted.
One interesting question is to what extent the degree of segmentation is uniform over the entire
distribution of the real wages. By creating four separate groups of workers deﬁned by the wage
quartile,26 we can have a better understanding of the pattern of segmentation in diﬀerent intervals
of the wage distribution. To test the signiﬁcance of the segmentation degree diﬀerence between
contiguous quartiles, we ran a nested regression (benchmark) including the interactions between
sectoral choice and indicators of the wage quartile. An interesting pattern emerges from this table.
The segmentation is much larger for low-wage workers, and is negative in the top quartile. The results
in table 10 indicate that the wage premium for low wage workers is around 15% in favor of the formal
sector. The second group has a lower – but still signiﬁcant – degree of segmentation (7.7%). The
third group display no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between wages in the diﬀerent sectors. Finally, in the
top of the distribution one ﬁnds evidence supporting that the segmentation is non-existent, with
the wage diﬀerential being in favor of informal workers, which is predicted by the classical theory.
The bottom panel depicts the results of F-tests, which allow us to statistically conﬁrm the diﬀerence
between adjacent quartiles. More segmentation at the bottom of the wage scale may be consequence
of a binding minimum wage constraint for low-productivity workers. On the other hand, the top of
the distribution is non-segmented. This result was expected, since the minimum wage is not binding
and reputational concerns become more relevant. An informal worker may be more reluctant to
seek compensation from the employer through the judiciary system once the informal contract is
severed, since the market is more concentrated and the ﬂow of information among employers about
an employee’s reliability is more intense. Therefore, the cost of resort to courts (in terms of future
employment prospectus) is higher. Those results should be taken with caution, since low-wage
workers also tend to be younger and less educated. To control for such heterogeneity we run the
same regression including interactions of sectoral choice and the possible intervening variables (the
same used in table 6). The results, which are available upon request, display the same pattern as
before, with segmentation decreasing with wage.
As discussed in section 5, the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator would be biased if the decision to seek a
position in the other sector is correlated with the wage/earning variation. In ths case, we have to
correct for the bias by ﬁnding an instrument: a variable that explains the sectoral choice but is
not correlated with the error in the earnings regression. That is, we need a variable that explains
earnings only indirectly, through its impact on sectoral choice. In the ﬁrst stage, we ran a probit
model with random eﬀects, calculating the estimated probability of being in one of the formal sector,
as a function of the variable frac. This variable is construct as the number on children under 10
over the number of members in the household. It can be argued that families with a high number of
26The individuals were ranked according to the average wage in the two observed periods.Segmentation 13
children will attach a higher value to the beneﬁts granted to formal workers. Therefore, its members
will pursue a position in the formal sector more intensively. Indeed we can see at the bottom of table
11 that the variable is signiﬁcantly positive, i.e., workers who live in a household with more children
are more likely to be in the formal sector. The probabilities calculated in the ﬁrst stage are used to
construct the correction terms, which will be included in the main regression. Now, by running a
ﬁxed eﬀect regression, including the correction terms, we can observe that the level of segmentation
is still signiﬁcant. Actually, the estimated level of segmentation is even higher (11.5% versus 7.8% in
the pure ﬁxed eﬀect estimation). Nevertheless, the correction term is not signiﬁcant, which suggests
that the pure ﬁxed eﬀect strategy is consistent, and, since the two-step procedure is less eﬃcient,
one should prefer the more parcimonious model.
Finally, including self-employed workers in our sample does not change much the main conclusions
of our study. Column 3 of table 11 shows the results of the benchmark regressions after adding in
a variable that identiﬁes if the worker is self-employed or not. We can see that there is a wage
premium of 9.5% after changing from the informal sector to a self-employed position. The degree of
segmentation between formal and informal barely changes. Comparing the segmentation found in
this case with the one found in the benchmark regression without the self-employed workers (column
1), the wage premium slightly increases from 7.8% to 8.3%.
7 Conclusion and Directions for further Research
In this paper we have measured the degree of segmentation in the Brazilian labor market using a
genuine panel of individuals, which allowed us to control for unobservable individual attributes that
are constant over time. We ﬁnd the average wage diﬀerential between formal and informal workers
to be 7.8%, suggesting that the Brazilian labor market is indeed segmented. Moreover, we observe
that some individual characteristics have diﬀerent impacts on the level of segmentation. For instance,
females, head of households, older, and more educated workers experience smaller (larger) wage losses
(gains) when transferring from formal (informal) to informal (formal) employment. The segmentation
seems to be more pervasive among young, low-educated men, who are not the main bread earners
of their respective families. Also, the wage diﬀerential is much higher in the manufacturing industry
and smaller in services. Finally, segmentation seems to be deeper to those in the bottom of the wage
distribution, mild to those in the middle and inexistent in the top.
To the best of our knowledge, the strategy used in this paper has never been applied to study this
phenomenon in Brazil, and we claimed that our method requires weaker assumptions for consistency
than the other approaches used so far to measure segmentation. Nevertheless, as explained in the
empirical strategy section, our results rely on the assumption that the sectoral choice is not correlated
with wages through the non-ﬁxed part of the error terms. In order to relax that assumption, we
applied a two-step estimation method, which estimates a random eﬀect probit in the ﬁrst method to
construct correction terms for the second stage. The second stage still uses a ﬁxed-eﬀect approach
and delivers consistent estimator even in the presence of correlation between wage and sectoral
choice through non-ﬁxed elements of the error terms. Another big advantage of this approach is
that it creates a very straightforward way to test if the simple ﬁxed-eﬀect model utilized in this
paper is consistent, i.e., if the only source of endogeneity of sectoral choice comes from individual
ﬁxed characteristics. Nevertheless, we can not conclude that the two-step procedure generates better
estimates than the pure ﬁxed-eﬀect model, once we the correction term is found to be non-signiﬁcant.
References
Amadeo, E., Gill, I., and Neri, M. (2000) “Brazil: The Pressure Points in Labor Legislation.”
Ensaios Econˆ omicos (Funda¸ c˜ ao Get´ ulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro), 395.Segmentation 14
Barros, R., Mello, R., and Pero, V. (1993) “Informal Labor Contracts: A Solution or a
Problem?” IPEA - Texto para Discuss˜ ao 291.
Botelho, F. B. and Ponczek, V. P. (2006) “A Note on Endogenous Switching with Panel
Data.”
Carneiro, F. G. and Henley, A. (2001) “Modelling Formal vs. Informal Employment and
Earnings: Micro-econometric Evidence for Brazil.” U of Wales at Aberystwyth Management &
Business Working Paper No. 2001-15.
Corseuil, C. H. and Foguel, M. N. (2002) “Uma sugest˜ ao de deﬂatores para rendas obtidas a
partir de algumas pesquisas domiciliares do IBGE.” Discussion Paper 897, Instituto de Pesquisa
Econˆ omicas Aplicadas.
Filho, N. A. M., Mendes, M., and oes de Almeida, E. S. (2004) “O Diferencial de Sal´ arios
Formal-Informal no Brasil: Segmenta¸ c˜ ao ou Vi´ es de Sele¸ c˜ ao?” Revista Brasileira de Economia
58(2): pp. 235–248.
Leontaridi, M. (1998) “Segmented Labour Markets: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Economic
Surveys 12(1): pp. 103–109.
Magnac, T. (1991) “Segmented or Competitive Labor Markets?” Econometrica 59(1): pp. 165–87.
Maloney, W. F. (1999) “Does Informality Imply Segmentation in Urban Labor Markets? Evidence
from Sectoral Transitions in Mexico.” World Bank Economic Review 13(2): pp. 275–302.
Maloney, W. F. (2004) “Informality Revisited.” World Development 32(7): pp. 1159–1178.
Pratap, S. and Quintin, E. (2006) “Are Labor Markets Segmented in Developing Countries? A
Semiparametric Approach.” European Economic Reveiw (forthcoming).
Rosen, S. (1986) The Theory of Equalizing Diﬀerences, vol. 1, chap. 6, pp. 641–692. Elsevier
Science.
Shapiro, C. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1984) “Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline
Device.” American Economic Review 74(3): pp. 433–444.
Ulyssea, G. (2005) “Informalidade no Mercado de Trabalho Brasileiro: Uma Resenha da Liter-
atura.” Tech. Rep. 1070, Instituo de Pesquisas Econˆ omicas Aplicadas - IPEA.Segmentation 15
Appendix – Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Count Percentage
Informal Formal Informal Formal
sample size 40,398 115,835 25.9% 74.1%
by gender
male 22,328 71,636 23.8% 76.2%
female 18,070 44,199 29.0% 71.0%
by head of household
yes 18,407 64,120 22.3% 77.7%
no 21,991 51,715 29.8% 70.2%
by industry
manufacturing 5,546 29,322 15.9% 84.1%
construction 3,710 5,556 40.0% 60.0%
commerce 4,948 17,248 22.3% 77.7%
services 25,273 63,096 28.6% 71.4%
by year/wave
1995/96 11,646 34,759 25.1% 74.9%
1997/98 13,853 41,406 25.1% 74.9%
1999/00 14,899 39,670 27.3% 72.7%
by state
Recife/PE 5,609 11,842 32,1% 67.9%
Salvador/BA 5,222 14,075 27.1% 72.9%
Belo Horizonte/BH 10,063 23,578 29.9% 70.1%
Rio de Janeiro/RJ 7,628 23,966 24.1% 74.9%
S˜ ao Paulo/SP 9,217 26,017 26.2% 73.8%
Porto Alegre/RS 5,342 20,218 20.9% 79.1%
Mean Diﬀerence Standard Error
Informal Formal (Formal-Informal)
wage 1.866 2.63 0.770 0.0237
hours worked 41.523 41.788 0.265 0.0656
age 33.502 34.734 1.233 0.0618
years of schooling 6.887 8.067 1.179 0.0231
Note: Except for the variable wage, statistics were calculated with the ﬁrst interview only.
The wage variable was constructed as the average of the wage in the 1th and 5th interviews.
Table 2: Wage within quartiles
Quartile mean std. dev. min max % of Informal
1st quartile 0.627 0.161 0.026 0.882 41.42%
2nd quartile 1.127 0.150 0.882 1.408 23.08%
3rd quartile 1.862 0.312 1.408 2.525 18.79%
4th quartile 6.245 5.814 2.525 265.95 17.35%Segmentation 16
Table 3: Hausman Test
(b) (B) (b)-(B) (Vb − VB)2
ﬁxed-eﬀects random-eﬀects Diﬀerence S.E.
formal 0.0780 0.2152 -0.1372 0.0030
ﬁxed-eﬀects (b): consistent under H0 and Ha
random-eﬀects (B): inconsistent under Ha, eﬃcient under H0
H0: diﬀerence in coeﬃcients is not systematic.
χ2
(11) = (b − B)0[Vb − VB]−1(b − B) = 3,319.07
p-value=0.0000
Note: log of real wages is the dependent variable. Regressions include
year, sector, and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Students and individuals with
schooling transition were excluded.
Table 4: Direction of transition
Variable Coeﬃcient
(Std. Error)
informal to formal (ˆ β1) 0.07235
(0.00633)
formal to informal (ˆ β2) 0.08487
(0.00697)
H0 : β1 − β2 = 0
ˆ β1 − ˆ β2 -0.01252
(0.00974)
Note: log of real wages is the dependent
variable. Regressions include year, sector,
and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Students and
individuals with schooling transition were
excluded.
Table 5: Wage within quartiles
Quartile mean std. dev. min max % of Informal
1st quartile 0.627 0.161 0.026 0.882 41.42%
2nd quartile 1.127 0.150 0.882 1.408 23.08%
3rd quartile 1.862 0.312 1.408 2.525 18.79%
4th quartile 6.245 5.814 2.525 265.95 17.35%Segmentation 17
Table 6: Robustness check
Variable Coeﬃcient
(Std. Error)
(1) (2) (3)
formal 0.05726 0.05726 0.04288
(0.03536) (0.03536) (0.03709)
formal × self-reported – -0.00079 –
(0.01591)
formal × complete – – 0.01777
(0.01386)
formal × male 0.03692 0.03690 0.03687
(0.01576) (0.01577) (0.01576)
formal × head 0.01441 0.01452 0.01456
(0.01547) (0.01561) (0.01547)
formal × male × head -0.05341 -0.05348 -0.05353
(0.01930) (0.01934) (0.01930)
formal × spouse -0.03727 -0.03721 -0.03741
(0.01526) (0.01531) (0.01526)
formal × male × spouse -0.01936 -0.01943 -0.01924
(0.05014) (0.05016) (0.05014)
formal × 1996 0.06958 0.06958 0.06917
(0.02954) (0.02954) (0.02954)
formal × 1997 0.11890 0.11891 0.11847
(0.03109) (0.03109) (0.03109)
formal × 1998 0.08548 0.08549 0.08483
(0.02964) (0.02964) (0.02964)
formal × 1999 0.09918 0.09919 0.09862
(0.03079) (0.03079) (0.03079)
formal × 2000 0.10478 0.10478 0.10610
(0.02953) (0.02953) (0.02955)
formal × Salvador/BA -0.02021 -0.02018 -0.02063
(0.01921) (0.01922) (0.01922)
formal × Belo Horizonte/MG -0.01818 -0.01814 -0.01882
(0.01719) (0.01721) (0.01720)
formal × Rio de Janeiro/RJ -0.04120 -0.04117 -0.04174
(0.01778) (0.01779) (0.01778)
formal × Sˆ ao Paulo/SP -0.01070 -0.01068 -0.01107
(0.01705) (0.01705) (0.01705)
formal × Porto Alegre/RS -0.05034 -0.05029 -0.05111
(0.01819) (0.01823) (0.01820)Segmentation 18
Table 6: Robustness check (contd.)
Variable Coeﬃcient
(Std. Error)
(1) (2) (3)
formal × Dec/Jan 0.02961 0.02961 0.02905
(0.01325) (0.01325) (0.01326)
formal × age=1 -0.00130 -0.00130 -0.00202
(0.01340) (0.01340) (0.01341)
formal × age=2 -0.05867 -0.05865 -0.05980
(0.01971) (0.01972) (0.01973)
formal × schooling=1 0.00757 0.00759 0.00705
(0.01584) (0.01584) (0.01584)
formal × schooling=2 -0.01132 -0.01129 -0.01188
(0.03014) (0.03015) (0.03015)
formal × age=1 × schooling=1 -0.03949 -0.03946 -0.03900
(0.02165) (0.02166) (0.02165)
formal × age=1 × schooling=2 -0.04741 -0.04736 -0.04687
(0.03541) (0.03542) (0.03541)
formal × age=2 × schooling=1 0.02215 0.02214 0.02315
(0.04106) (0.04106) (0.04107)
formal × age=2 × schooling=2 -0.03861 -0.03861 -0.03781
(0.05091) (0.05091) (0.05091)
formal × construction -0.07797 -0.07799 -0.07838
(0.02362) (0.02362) (0.02362)
formal × commerce -0.03311 -0.03311 -0.03283
(0.01744) (0.01744) (0.01744)
formal × services -0.05389 -0.05388 -0.05393
(0.01065) (0.01065) (0.01065)
Intercept 0.30441 0.30442 0.30672
(0.02615) (0.02615) (0.02621)
N 242,501 242,501 242,501
Note: log of real wages is the dependent variable. Regressions include
year, sector, and individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Students and individuals with
schooling transition were excluded.
Table 7: Transitions between Sectors and Self-Employment
5th int → Informal Formal Self-Employed Total
↓ 1st int Count Frequency Count Frequency Count Frequency
Informal 13,892 51.24% 7,813 28.82% 5,406 19.94% 27,111
Formal 6,481 8.13% 69,482 87.11% 3,801 4.77% 79,764
Self-employed 5,493 12.72% 3,564 8.25% 34,124 79.03% 43,181
Total 25,866 17.24% 80,859 53.89% 43,331 28.88% 150,056Segmentation 19
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Table 10: Segmentation by wage quartiles
Variable Coeﬃcient
(Std. Error)
formal × 1st quartile of wage (ˆ β1) 0.14811
(0.00893)
formal × 2nd quartile of wage (ˆ β2) 0.07763
(0.00843)
formal × 3rd quartile of wage (ˆ β3) 0.01278
(0.00905)
formal × 4th quartile of wage (ˆ β4) -0.04385
(0.00982)
F-tests
Hypothesis Test statistic
H0 : β1 = β2 ˆ β1 − ˆ β2 0.07047
(0.01220)
H0 : β2 = β3 ˆ β2 − ˆ β3 0.06485
(0.01232)
H0 : β3 = β4 ˆ β3 − ˆ β4 0.05663
(0.01335)
Note: log of real wages is the dependent variable. Re-
gressions include year, sector, and individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
Students and individuals with schooling transition were
excluded.
Table 11: Extensions
Variable Coeﬃcient
(Std. Error)
(1) (2) (3)
formal 0.07801 0.11556 0.08313
(0.00409) (0.04582) (0.00484)
self-employed – – 0.09517
(0.00539)
correction term – -0.03274 –
(0.03931)
1st stage: probit
dependent variable: formal
frac – 0.21798 –
(0.04527)
Note: log of real wages is the dependent variable. Re-
gressions include year, sector, and individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
Students and individuals with schooling transition were
excluded.